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A Total Eclipse of the Heart: Compensation Strategies in Entrepreneurial Nonprofits 
 
Abstract: We examine how shifting resource dependencies influence compensation strategy 
during commercial transitions within entrepreneurial nonprofits. Longitudinal sample of 4,732 
cultural nonprofits from the United States, show compensation strategies reflective of 
contributed resource dependence shift non-linearly as nonprofits transition to market-based 
resource dependence. Dynamic quadratic models unveil a dual threshold of commercialization 
concerning this transition. Nonprofits at moderate stage of commercialization, contend with 
competing resource dependencies from both contributed and market-based sources, resulting in a 
decrease in their compensation and an increase in part-time employment. At higher stages, 
contributed resource dependence is eclipsed by market-based dependence, reflected in nonprofit 
compensation strategies.   
 
1. Executive Summary  
Social entrepreneurship occurs when organizations blend the creation of social value with 
market-based revenue generation. One important category of social entrepreneurship relates to 
entrepreneurial non-profit organizations (NPOs), which fall along a continuum of 
commercialization dependent on the percentage of their revenue that is generated from market-
based sources. An important research stream has begun to examine how commercialization 
affects NPO strategy and outcomes (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Nason et al., 2018). This 
research extends that stream by examining the effect of commercialization on compensation 
strategy. 
The commercialization of NPOs is a hotly debated topic in research and policy. While some 
tout the benefits of commercialization include greater autonomy, financial stability, and 
flexibility (Kim, 2016; Klein et al., 2013; Salamon, 2001b), others argue that it threatens an 
NPOs legitimacy, fundraising, and survival (Brown, 2018; Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; 
Nason et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2012). Employees play a fundamental role in the success of 
NPOs, particularly as they undergo the structural transitions required for commercialization.  
Compensation strategy serves as an important tool both to attract and retain employees as well as 
a signal to external stakeholders.   
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This paper draws on Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) to 
show how commercialization fundamentally alters the resource dependencies within NPOs. As 
entrepreneurial NPOs commercialize, they transition through three stages: a dependence on 
resources that are contributed by external stakeholders; a dependence on resources earned 
through market-based activities; and a transitional stage between the two where both 
dependencies are present. We argue that this transition requires NPOs perform internal resource 
calculations to balance claims from their dominant stakeholders—nonprofit funders and 
overseers at low levels of commercialization, employees at high levels of commercialization, and 
both groups at moderate levels of commercialization—when developing compensation strategies.  
We test our hypotheses with longitudinal financial, programmatic, and operational data from 
4,732 registered 501(c)3 of arts and cultural NPOs in the U.S. We utilize dynamic Generalized 
Least Squares regression models to test our hypotheses and find non-linear relationships between 
commercialization and NPOs’ compensation strategy as well as identify two important 
thresholds of commercialization. NPOs initially depress compensation as they increase 
commercial activity, relying heavily on their employees’ willingness to donate labor at below-
market wages, effectively exploiting their commitment to mission. This effect is most 
pronounced when NPOs are equally dependent on contributed and market-based resources. Once 
commercialization reaches the point that NPOs are no longer beholden to their sources of 
contributed revenue, they improve compensation conditions in order to retain the talent 
necessary to maintain their market-based sources of revenue and expand their investments in 
programmatic roles. 
The goal of this research is to build upon an ongoing conversation regarding the effects of 
pursuing an increasing proportion of market-based revenue – relative to total revenue – within 
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entrepreneurial NPOs. We find that entrepreneurial NPOs shift their compensation strategies as 
they transition from contributed resource dependency to market-based resource dependency in 
ways that do not transfer benefit to their employees in a linear manner. These results build upon 
existing research by examining resource dependence in a dynamic setting, revealing a nuanced 
picture of how commercialization affects NPO compensation strategy as organizations grapple 
with shifting dependencies and the pressure these dependencies exert on compensation, for the 
better and for the worse.  
2. Introduction  
Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) are increasingly practicing a form of social entrepreneurship 
by pursuing market-based revenue from the sales of goods and services, much like businesses 
(Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Moss et al., 2011). It is widely believed that market-based 
revenue is beneficial for NPOs due to increasing competition and declining philanthropic giving 
(Lyons and Kickul, 2013). Positive effects of NPOs pursuing market-based revenue include: 
improved flexibility (Kim, 2017), financial independence (Salamon, 2001a), and enhanced 
organizational capabilities (Klein et al., 2013). Indeed, the field of social entrepreneurship 
assumes – implicitly or explicitly – that a hybrid model combining the pursuit of market-based 
revenue with a central social purpose is superior to the inefficient model of the charitable 
nonprofit. 
Nonetheless, where there are opportunities there are threats. As NPOs behave more like 
businesses, they are exposed to increased scrutiny over their management practices, particularly 
relating to compensation. Overdependence on market-based revenue can jeopardize survival in 
entrepreneurial NPOs (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014), and the inherent risk associated with 
any entrepreneurial venture is heightened because the marketization of traditionally nonmarket 
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spheres is contentious (Brown, 2018; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). Straying too far from the 
institutional norms ascribed to the nonprofit sector by behaving “too much like a business” may 
further threaten an NPO’s legitimacy and make resource acquisition more difficult (Dees, 1998; 
Smith et al., 2012). In order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the costs and benefits 
of NPOs pursuing increasing proportions of market-based revenue relative to total revenue 
(which we refer to as commercialization), we need to examine the effects of these actions on 
specific organizational outcomes. 
Our study contributes to this broader conversation by examining one such outcome: the 
compensation strategies of entrepreneurial NPOs. Compensation practices – because of their 
visibility and the strong norms ascribed to the sector – are often the first characteristic to come 
under scrutiny as NPOs pursue market-based revenue. The nonprofit sector in the US has seen 
25% growth of new organizations in the past decade, making it the third largest workforce 
behind retail and manufacturing (Salamon, 2018). The sector accounted for approximately 12.3 
million jobs in 2016, or roughly 10.2 percent of total U.S. private sector employment (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2018). As such, the primary purpose of the study is to address the question: how 
does commercialization within NPOs affect compensation strategy?  
To address this question, we draw on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) coupled with related research examining the outcomes of commercialization within 
entrepreneurial NPOs (e.g.Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014) to inform our argument. We posit 
that as they become increasingly commercialized, NPO’s resource dependencies fundamentally 
shift from traditional sources of contributed revenue (contributed revenue dependence) to a 
dependence on market-based revenue (market-based resource dependence). Using a longitudinal 
sample of 4,732 U.S. cultural nonprofits, we show that compensation strategies reflective of 
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contributed resource dependence shift non-linearly as NPOs transition to market-based resource 
dependence. In addition, we uncover a dual threshold concerning this transition. 
Our analyses reveal nuanced empirical insights by operationalizing compensation strategies 
in terms of salary, job roles, and workforce composition (full time vs. part-time employees). We 
contribute to the related literature in three distinct ways. First, we identify two thresholds of 
commercialization where compensation strategy shifts, indicating the level of commercialization 
at which ex-post market-based resource dependencies eventually come to eclipse ex-ante 
contributed resource dependencies – and the expectations they contain – to reward 
entrepreneurial talent in highly commercialized NPOs. Second, we add to the underdeveloped 
research area of compensation strategies in entrepreneurial contexts (Manne, 2011), specifically 
uncovering how NPOs strategically shift workforce composition to respond to shifting resource 
dependencies. Third, we show that NPOs exploit donative labor from their employees to manage 
dual resource dependence. In doing so, we reveal a detailed picture of how shifting resource 
dependencies are managed during commercial transition.  
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. First, we review relevant research 
to set the stage for our theoretical framework in section three. Drawing on insights from resource 
dependence theory, in section four we develop a series of hypotheses predicting the effects of 
commercialization on different dimensions of NPO compensation strategy. We then discuss our 
empirical methods in section five and report the results of our analyses in section six. We 
conclude with a discussion of the implications for practitioners, limitations of our study, and 
suggestions for future research in section seven.  
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Entrepreneurship in Nonprofit Contexts 
Financial capital represents perhaps the most critical of resources for NPOs. In general, 
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NPOs acquire capital either through contributed sources, such as government grants, 
foundations, and donations or through market-based sources, such as the sale of 
products/services (Salamon, 1999). Traditionally, NPOs do not generate a significant portion of 
revenue through the sale of products/services, relying instead on contributed revenue (Fitzgerald 
and Shepherd, 2018). NPOs have been encouraged to diversify their revenue streams by adding 
independent business units (Froelich, 1999) due to several factors: pressure from external 
stakeholders to maintain low overhead (Bowman, 2006; Lecy and Searing, 2014), responding to 
a severe cost-revenue squeeze (Gregory and Howard, 2009; Nielson, 1986), and increasing 
competition (Kim, 2017). NPOs are said to be entrepreneurial when they “sense, select, and 
shape opportunities” (Abdelgawad et al., 2013: 394) to access new markets and generate more 
revenue from market-based sources (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Hitt et al., 2011; Ireland 
et al., 2003). We refer to the process of increasing the relative proportion of total revenue that 
comes from market-based sources in NPOs as commercialization. NPOs can be placed along a 
commercialization continuum (Figure 1) from being wholly dependent on contributed sources to 
being wholly dependent on market-based sources of revenue. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
NPOs relying heavily on their contributed sources of funding (those with low levels of 
commercialization) often find themselves in situations where external stakeholders have 
significant power over the organization, and a substantial body of literature has documented the 
expectations and restrictions these funders place on NPOs (e.g., Bowman, 2006; Lecy and 
Searing, 2014). Conversely, research shows that commercialization can enable NPOs to become 
more flexible, autonomous and financially independent (Kim, 2017; Salamon, 2001a), in 
addition to improving their organizational capabilities (Klein et al., 2013) and decreasing their 
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financial vulnerability (Carroll and Stater, 2008; Keating et al., 2005). Revenue diversification 
by NPOs’ reduces dependence on a handful of traditional NPO funders like governments and 
donors (Dees, 2007; Leroux, 2006) while also subverting increased competition for donative 
dollars and dire consequences of shrinking philanthropic support (Lyons and Kickul, 2013). 
Furthermore, commercialization provides NPOs the latitude to innovate within their mission-
related programs and to be bold in their strategic decisions (Parris et al., 2018).  
Despite the potential benefits of pursuing commercial revenue, NPOs engaging in these 
strategies face significant challenges and risks. First, NPO leaders often lack the managerial 
skills necessary for successful launch and management of commercial programs (Dees, 2012). 
Second, market-based revenue can depress individual donations to NPOs, especially if donors 
perceive such a strategy to be out of alignment with the organizational mission and/or 
incompetently managed (Smith et al., 2012). Third, mission drift and legitimacy threats present 
significant challenges that an NPO must successfully navigate as they commercialize (Fitzgerald 
and Shepherd, 2018; Nason et al., 2018; Pache and Santos, 2013). Finally, commercialization 
may directly impact NPO survival as shown by Gras and Mendoza-Abarca (2014) who found 
that entrepreneurial NPOs who become too dependent on market-based revenue are at an 
increased risk of failure.  
Since NPOs have historically had low levels of market-based revenue, funders have been the 
dominant stakeholders serving as gatekeepers of critical resources (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Funders have institutionalized expectations of how NPOs should act in order to receive funding 
that constrain NPO behavior. At its heart, a shift towards market-based revenue is an attempt for 
NPOs to strategically restructure their relationship with funders and more effectively balance the 
power exerted by these stakeholders. As entrepreneurial NPOs integrate market-based revenue 
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programs they must successfully adopt a blend of practices from both the commercial and 
nonprofit sectors (Pache and Santos, 2013). Failure to effectively navigate expectations from 
both sectors can undermine the legitimacy of mission driven organizations and their ability to 
attract adequate resources, ultimately diminishing their chance of survival (Battilana and Dorado, 
2010; Battilana and Lee, 2014).     
Distinct from the practices of for-profit organizations, if entrepreneurial NPOs capture 
enough market-based revenue to generate a profit the surplus must be reinvested back into the 
organization (Hansmann, 1981). This is a critical difference between nonprofit and for-profit 
entrepreneurship, as the legal non-distribution tax constraint in the nonprofit sector prevents 
founder(s), board members, and executives from appropriating organizational surplus. Extant 
research has yet to examine the extent to which market-based revenue in NPOs is reinvested in 
the most important of operational resources—human capital—via more competitive 
compensation strategies in NPOs. Next, we review the literature on compensation strategy 
relevant to the nonprofit context.  
3.2. Compensation Strategy in Nonprofit Contexts 
Compensation strategies include how much an organization spends on salary, fringe benefits, 
job role-based spending, and part-time versus full-time employment (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1992; Milkovich and Newman, 2008). Compensation strategies act as a signaling device that 
reflect organizational values, reinforce organizational culture, and influence employees’ 
willingness to join the organization and their likelihood of retention (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Employees play a critical role in achieving the pro-social goals in organizations since they are 
the conduits as well as stakeholders in these initiatives (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Margolis 
and Walsh, 2003; Risi and Wickert, 2016). When organizations combine purpose and profit, 
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buy-in from employees is essential, as employees are either a source of resistance or instigators 
of positive change (Wickert and de Bakker, 2018). The inclination for employees to make firm 
specific investments, such as leading organizational improvements (Hoskisson et al., 2018), 
creating positive organizational change (Wickert and de Bakker, 2018), increasing innovation 
(Corbett, 2018), and social impact (Hart et al., 2015) is influenced by compensation practices. 
Therefore, compensation expenditures are often an organization’s largest operating cost, 
accounting for “10-50 percent of total operating costs and as much as 90 percent in service or 
knowledge intensive organizations” (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992: 18). 
Despite its importance, compensation strategy within NPOs remains poorly understood. 
While employing roughly ten percent of the US workforce, NPOs have earned a reputation for 
paying submarket wages. Traditionally, the philanthropic funders have rewarded specific policies 
and actions that promote social welfare over paying market wages and expect a level of sacrifice 
from NPO employees (Dempsey and Sanders, 2010; Oster, 1995). Preston (1989) found 
nonprofit employees made 20% less than for-profit employees in similar roles, and when 
including fringe benefits, this cost differential increased to 40% (Emanuele, 1997). Some have 
explained the compensation differential by the willingness of employees to “donate” labor in the 
nonprofit sector, either through accepting sub-market wages (Rose-Ackerman, 1996) or donating 
their time beyond the hours they are compensated (Knutsen and Chan, 2014).  
NPOs with low levels of commercialization require fundraisers and managers who can 
successfully attract revenue from funders; whereas, NPOs with high levels of commercialization 
require employees with the skill sets necessary to attract revenue from the market, often meaning 
that NPOs have to recruit employees from the for-profit sector. As a result, entrepreneurial NPOs 
must effectively manage compensation strategies to attract and retain entrepreneurial talent while 
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simultaneously adhering to the more traditional expectations their dominant stakeholders have 
regarding expenses and compensation (Battilana and Dorado, 2010). 
Our review highlights two important insights for entrepreneurial NPOs. First, despite the 
espoused benefits of increasing the proportion of their total revenue from market-based sources, 
NPOs face significant challenges and risks in so doing. These risks are particularly salient with 
respect to NPOs’ most dominant stakeholders and their dependence on those gatekeepers of 
critical resources. Second, entrenched in the nonprofit sector is a history of exploitative 
compensation, where paying submarket wages has become institutionalized and taken for 
granted. Together, these arguments paint a troubling picture for NPOs seeking entrepreneurial 
opportunities in terms of both compensation and managing critical resource dependencies. In 
order to better understand the dynamics of these shifting dependencies and the effects of 
commercialization on nonprofit compensation strategies, we next turn our attention to resource 
dependence theory (RDT) to inform our hypotheses. 
4. Theory and Hypotheses 
RDT offers valuable insights for both entrepreneurship in the NPO context (Gras and 
Mendoza-Abarca, 2014) and compensation strategy in organizations (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1992; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987). According to RDT, the survival of an organization is 
dependent on its ability to manage an unpredictable external environment in order to secure a 
stable flow of resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The focal organization is constrained by 
actors in their external environment and “become interdependent with those elements of the 
environment with which they transact” (Pfeffer, 1982: 192-193). The two primary dimensions of 
the dependence that focal organizations experience are mutual dependence— the sum of bilateral 
dependencies experienced and power imbalance— when external actors wield more power over 
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resource relationships. The RDT perspective posits the interplay of these two dimensions drives 
organizational strategies (Casciaro and Pirskorki, 2005).   
For entrepreneurial NPOs in particular, as the level of commercialization increases 
dependence on contributed sources of revenue decreases, fundamentally shifting the power 
balance between the NPO and its funders (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014). At the same time, 
as commercialization increases, so too does dependence on employees with skillsets related to 
capturing market-based revenue. According to RDT, these shifting dependencies as a will have 
direct implications for compensation strategy (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987). However, extant 
theory fails to provide a clear framework for predicting how exactly commercialization 
influences compensation strategy as NPOs transition from contributed resource dependence to 
market-based resource dependence. Accordingly, in the sections to follow, we deduce a set of 
hypotheses by extending RDT in this unique context of shifting resource dependency. We have 
included Table 1 at the end of this section to summarize the theoretical arguments outlined for 
each of our hypotheses. 
4.1 Contributed vs. Market-based Resource Dependence and Compensation 
RDT predicts that the survival of traditional NPOs is predicated upon their ability to secure a 
continuous flow of capital from the contributed sources. Accordingly, the gatekeepers of these 
resources represent the most influential external stakeholders to whom the organization is 
ultimately accountable (Mitchell et al., 1997). Resources derived from these stakeholders extend 
beyond their financial contributions to NPOs, as relationships with these stakeholders confer 
legitimacy, and government agencies grant NPOs the ability to receive tax deductible 
contributions (Salamon, 2001a, 2018). From the perspective of NPOs, key funders such as 
corporate donors, private donors, and/or government agencies can easily shift their support to 
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similar nonprofits (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Gronbjerg, 1991). Thus, NPOs with 
significant contributed resource dependence (situated at the lower end of the commercialization 
continuum) are power disadvantaged and will experience serious social control of their strategic 
choices from various nonprofit stakeholders. 
Consequently, a shift towards commercialization is often an attempt by NPOs to unilaterally 
restructure the power dynamic with dominant stakeholders (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014). 
Employees are an important organizational resource and part of internal resource calculus for 
unilateral restructuring (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Pfeffer, 1982). Donors and funders 
emphasize maximum resource allocation to NPOs’ core mission, exerting external pressure to 
keep overhead expenses low (Bowman, 2006; Lecy and Searing, 2014). Compensation spending 
drives up NPOs’ overhead expenses and is easily observable to stakeholders, through internal 
reports and publicly available tax returns (Benzing et al., 2011; Chikoto and Neely, 2014). Often 
NPOs will conform to institutional expectations of ‘donative labor’ (i.e., paying below market 
wages) to maintain legitimacy (King and Lewis, 2017). Furthermore, NPO employees tend to 
value social impact over financial success and widely demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice 
higher pay (Dees, 2012). In this regard, employees and the organization engage in a mutually 
dependent relationship that is rooted in shared goals and values. If NPOs pay excessively, they 
may stress their contributed resource dependence and, in extreme cases, jeopardize their tax-
exempt status (Nonprofits, 2018). Therefore, NPOs exposed to contributed resource dependence 
will experience downward pressure on their compensation spending.  
However, entrepreneurial NPOs shifting from contributed resource dependence to market-
based resource dependence often experience dual resource dependence—where they are reliant 
on attracting resources from both contributed and market-based sources at roughly similar levels.  
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In this stage of commercialization, entrepreneurial NPOs are beholden to expectations from both 
sectors. The pressure to utilize compensation strategy as a signal of conformity is especially 
strong when NPOs are experiencing dual resource dependence because of the legitimacy threat 
and additional scrutiny that accompanies commercialization. Therefore, it stands to reason that 
NPOs with dual resource dependency will experience downward pressures on compensation 
spending. 
But according to the nonprofit (Kim, 2017; King and Lewis, 2017) and social 
entrepreneurship (DTI, 2002; Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Haugh, 2005) literature, as 
social purpose organizations commercialize, they increasingly resemble businesses. Intuitively, 
entrepreneurial NPOs will come to rely on market-based revenue and, therefore, experience less 
influence of contributed resource dependence. Instead, entrepreneurial NPOs (at the higher end 
of the commercialization continuum) experience market-based resource dependence. Market-
based resource dependence constitutes a form of social control of NPOs’ choices, commonly 
experienced by businesses that emanate from paying customers, competitors, and employees—
not primarily motivated by a desire for self-sacrifice and social welfare. Recent studies show that 
NPOs pursuing commercialization require entrepreneurial expertise and talent (Parris et al., 
2018). Therefore, we argue that market-based resource dependence will make the sectoral norms 
of donative labor motivated compensation strategies untenable for NPOs.  
The value of competitive compensation practices for commercial success of organizations 
(Becker, 1975; Carnahan et al., 2012; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lazear and Rosen, 1981) is 
widely accepted. To acquire and retain top talent, organizations must spend adequately on 
compensation (Bryant and Allen, 2013). In the for-profit contexts, transactional and self-
interested employment contracts dominate (Thornton et al., 2012). Market-based resource 
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dependence subsumes these various forces that collectively stress on the mutually dependent 
relationship shared between NPOs and their employees. On the high end of the 
commercialization continuum, we expect there to be a threshold whereby market-based resource 
dependence comes to eclipse contributed resource dependence. At this point, organizational 
survival and success is no longer dependent upon securing resources from traditional funding 
sources, and instead the dependency shifts to attracting and retaining top-tier talent. In sum, we 
propose a nonlinear (U-shaped) association between commercialization and compensation 
spending.  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a convex relationship between commercialization and 
compensation spending in NPOs (first negative, then positive).  
 
4.2 Compensation strategy: Managing Job Roles in Entrepreneurial Nonprofits 
RDT also sheds light on differences in compensation spending by job roles in organizations 
(Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987). Specifically, from an RDT 
perspective, groups and subunits within organizations that harbor competencies and “capabilities 
that are most needed” garner the most “influence and control over the organization” (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978: 25). As a result, those roles perceived to provide the most value to the 
organization come to command the largest share of compensation expenditures within 
organizations (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1987). We focus on three prominent inter-firm coalitions 
or job roles in NPOs: administrative, fundraising, and programmatic roles.  
Negative views on administrative roles drive conversation around overhead expenses in 
traditional NPOs and are often regarded as deviation from mission-related spending (Bowman, 
2006; Lecy and Searing, 2014). NPOs on the lower end of the commercialization continuum, 
constrained by contributed resource dependence, will experience pressure to spend less on 
administrative roles so that they can keep overheads low and efficiency scores high (Callen et al., 
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2003). In contrast, as market-based resource dependence comes to dominate NPOs will have the 
freedom, as well as, the need to spend more on administrative roles. Administrators ensure the 
seamless co-existence of various of organizational parts, integration of blended goals, and ensure 
smooth overall operation (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Parris et al., 2018), especially useful 
to NPOs experiencing dual resource dependence. Therefore, we expect a nonlinear relationship 
between commercialization and compensation spending on administrative roles in NPOs.  
Furthermore, job roles that help organizations “cope with environmental requirements,” are 
considered important strategic employee groups from an RDT perspective (Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin, 1992: 25). Both fundraising and programmatic roles meet this criterion. We anticipate 
fundraising role expenditure to be highest in organizations with high contributed resource 
dependency because expertise is needed to effectively solicit funds external funders and comply 
with impact reporting requirements (Thomson, 2010). Studies show fundraising spending efforts 
pay off in the form of higher charitable contributions to NPOs (Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986). 
However, many argue that even with moderate commercial revenue, NPOs will still need 
contributed revenue since they cannot fully recoup production costs (Kim, 2016), thus requiring 
expenditures on fundraising roles for entrepreneurial NPOs with a dual resource dependence. As 
NPOs increase their level of commercialization, they will also need to invest in employees with 
business expertise who are able to solicit resources from market-based sources. Once market-
based resource dependence effectively eclipses contributed resource dependence we expect to 
see a drop in fundraising role expenditures because entrepreneurial NPOs will no longer be 
reliant on contributed sources of revenue and instead will need to invest most heavily in roles 
requiring business expertise. Therefore, we expect a nonlinear (inverted-U) relationship between 
commercialization and compensation spending on fundraising roles in NPOs. We expect the 
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opposite for NPO programmatic roles.  
The nonlinear (U-shaped) associational logic between commercialization and compensation 
expenditure, applies the most to programmatic job roles in NPOs. Programmatic positions allow 
NPOs to accomplish their social welfare goals and, thereby, gain sectoral legitimacy (Van Slyke, 
2002). While RDT tells us that the greater the value of a job role for a business organization, the 
more it will spend on compensating those roles (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), employee willingness to accept lower wages for meaningful work remains 
significant (Franceschini et al., 2015; Nason et al., 2018), especially in mission related roles 
(Dempsey and Sanders, 2010). Therefore, we expect that the downward pressures of dual 
resource dependence on compensation spending will be most significant in the programmatic 
roles, for NPOs trying to balance the need to keep overall compensation expenditures low with 
the need for both fundraising and business expertise. Logically, as in our first hypothesis, we 
expect that market-based resource dependence will eclipse contributed resource dependence, 
after a certain threshold of commercialization and programmatic spending will increase in order 
for the NPO to more effectively carry out its mission. Thus, we expect a nonlinear (first negative, 
then positive) association between commercialization and NPO compensation expenditure on 
programmatic roles.  
Hypothesis 2: There will be a nonlinear relationship between commercialization and salary 
spending by job roles in NPOs, such that: 
Hypothesis 2a: For administrative roles, there will be a convex relationship between 
commercialization and salary spending (first negative, then positive). 
Hypothesis 2b: For fundraising roles, there will be a concave relationship between 
commercialization and salary spending (first positive, then negative). 
Hypothesis 2c: For programmatic roles, there will be a convex relationship between 
commercialization and salary spending (first negative, then positive). 
 
4.3 Part-Time Employment in Entrepreneurial Nonprofits 
In for-profit contexts, many highly entrepreneurial organizations tend to use more part-time 
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employment (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992: 92). Due to environmental instability of 
entrepreneurial settings, more organic organizational arrangements—like part-time employment 
arrangements—are attractive to for-profit firms. An estimated 27.7 million people in the U.S. 
work part-time or as temporary or contingent employees, of whom about 77% voluntary choose 
to do so and are more than twice as likely to be women (Dunn, 2018).  
From an RDT perspective, part-time workers stand to play a different role in NPOs. Most 
part-time NPO workers do not usually have job security or earn fringe benefits, and some see 
them as unwaged laborers primarily benefitting the NPOs more than the employees (Baines, 
2004). Contingent employees can allow NPOs to optimize their workforce size, reduce slack, and 
generate value in seasonal sectors like arts and cultural NPOs (De Stefano et al., forthcoming; 
Paarlberg and Ghosh Moulick, 2017). Entrepreneurship can be disruptive and uncertain for 
NPOs (Fitzgerald and Shepherd, 2018; Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Kirkman, 2012), and 
part-time labor can help alleviate some of this risk. Part-time employees can provide a broader 
range of expertise for the same financial investment and can easily be let go if an entrepreneurial 
foray is unsuccessful, effectively shifting entrepreneurial risk onto employees and away from the 
organization. We anticipate organizations experiencing dual resource dependence to rely most 
heavily on part-time contingent labor.  
Contingent employment has its downsides as well, which will apply most to NPOs with 
market-based resource dependence. There is an ongoing discussion about the detrimental effects 
of part-time workers for organizational success in for-profit contexts. Part-time workers are 
supposed to be less committed, often associated with operational disruption, breakdown in 
communication, and slow organizational learning (De Stefano et al., forthcoming). Also, because 
they spend less time at work, part-time employees tend to “have less work role involvement, less 
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positive work attitudes, and higher turnover intentions” (Wittmer and Martin, 2011: 780). 
Furthermore, sustaining blended organizational goals are challenging for NPOs. To sustain 
innovation, organizations must retain talent (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992). For all these 
reasons, NPOs on the higher end of the commercialization continuum will experience downward 
pressure on part-time employment. In essence, once market-based resource dependence eclipses 
contributed resource dependence, entrepreneurial NPOs will respond by creating full-time 
positions to retain talent necessary to attract market-based revenue. We expect a nonlinear 
(inverted-U) association between NPO commercialization and part-time employment.  
Hypothesis 3: There will be a concave relationship between commercialization and part-time 
employment in NPOs (first positive, then negative).  
[Table 1 about here] 
4. Methodology, Data, and Variables  
4.1 Sample 
Compensation practices vary dramatically by sector (Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003). Therefore, 
to asses similarly situated NPOs, we focus on arts and cultural NPOs in the U.S. Arts and 
cultural organizations represent a substantial and diverse group of individuals and occupations, 
encompassing a wide range of artistic, technical, and managerial positions and are archetypal of 
the overall nonprofit sector. The arts and cultural industry employ nearly 4.8 million individuals 
with total compensation exceeding $350 billion annually in the U.S. (NASAA, 2018). Among 
artists, 46% of this workforce is female. But while nearly 78% of dancers/choreographers are 
women, two of the highest earning sub-categories of artists—architects and 
producers/directors—are overwhelmingly male (75% and 63% respectively) (NEA, 2011). Artist 
occupations tend to have higher educational attainment, with approximately 54% holding 
bachelor’s degrees or higher, as compared to 26% of the overall U.S. labor force (NEA, 2008).  
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To test our predictions, we acquired our data from DataArts (formerly known as the Cultural 
Data Project or CDP), a multiyear initiative that compiles an online survey of financial, 
programmatic, and operational information of arts and cultural 501(c)3 NPOs across all U.S. 
states. Our sample consists of 4,732 registered 501(c)3 NPOs over the period 2002-2015. After 
accounting for observations with missing values, we have on average 4.2 years of organizational 
data.1 This dataset provides more nuanced and vetted information than IRS 990 data on arts and 
cultural NPOs (Charles and Kim, 2016; Kim et al., 2017).  
4.2 Variables 
To test our hypotheses, we assess three facets of NPO compensation strategy using five 
outcome variables. First, we operationalize compensation spending by calculating the total salary 
expenditure scaled by total employees, expressed in thousands (Model 1: Sal/Emp). Second, 
three variables represent compensation by job roles: the ratio of administrative salary exp to total 
salary expenditure (Model 2: Admin/Sal), the ratio of fundraising salary expenditure to total 
salary expenditure (Model 3: Fund/Sal), and the ratio of programmatic salary expenditure to total 
salary expenditure (Model 4: Prog/Sal). Third, contingent employment dependence is 
operationalized as the ratio of part-time employees to all employees (Model 5: Part/Emp). 
Our main predictor is commercialization, operationalized as the level of dependence on 
market-based revenue in NPOs (%Commercial), expressed as a proportion. We calculate this as 
the ratio of market-based revenue to total revenue, following past research in this domain (Gras 
and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Mendoza-Abarca and Gras, 2017). We simultaneously include the 
 
1 The DataArts dataset involves a self-reported survey collected annually from arts & cultural NPOs (Charles and 
Kim, 2016; Kim et al., 2017). The methodological philosophy adopted for our analyses was to favor inclusion to 
enhance generalizability while retaining theoretically relevant control variables. As such, there is a degree of human 
error in data inputting and many organizations only report information for a year. In addition, careful data cleanup, 
variable transformations, dynamic modeling, and limiting to those observations available for all variables further 
reduced our available sample for the final analysis. Important differences exist between NPOs in our sample (mostly 
larger and mature organizations) and those excluded, as reported in Table A5 in the Appendix.  
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square term of this variable in our models to test our nonlinear hypotheses.  
We also control for the following relevant additional factors: organization age, 
organizational size, non-market-based revenue, operating efficiency, profitability, competition, 
board size, and the number of volunteers. Next, we describe each control. Organizational age 
(Age) is calculated as the difference between the year an NPO was founded from the last year it 
appears in our sample. Compensation increases with organizational size (Wasserman, 2006). 
Therefore, we assess organizational size with assets (Schepker et al., 2018) and include the log of 
assets (Assets(log)). To account for revenue from revenue sources other than market-based 
means (Gras et al. 2014), we account for the proportion of government funding (%Government) 
and private donations (%Donations). We assess operating efficiency in managing resources with 
return on assets (ROA). It is calculated by dividing NPO’s unrestricted total revenue net total 
expenses by total assets. We also control for profitability (Margin), by calculating the 
unrestricted total revenue less total expenses divided by unrestricted total revenue. In both cases, 
unrestricted revenue is free from spending stipulations often set by NPO funders making it the 
most discretionary funding category in NPOs (Weikart et al., 2012).  
Local competition may also exert pressure on compensation and hiring practices. Therefore, 
we control for competitive pressure by including the number of NPOs that share the same 
National Information Systems Project (NISP) code in an NPO’s county (Competition) in our 
sample. Boards also play a crucial role of organizational oversight (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Light, 2008; Williamson, 1981) and, when ineffective, can lead to higher compensation (Core et 
al., 1999). Therefore, we include the number of board members (Board Size). We control for the 
number of volunteers (Volunteers) to account for access to uncompensated labor. To account for 
unique compensation trends in different sub-sectors within the arts and culture field, we also 
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include binary predictors for NISP codes. Summary statistics and pairwise correlations are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.  
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
4.3 Model and analysis 
We estimate our five NPO compensation related outcomes using dynamic Generalized Least 
Square Regression models, with a year lag of the outcomes (StataCorp, 2017; Xu et al., 2019). 
Inclusion of squared predictor, based on the nonlinear hypotheses, renders quadratic models. 
Random unit effects are incorporated to capture NPOs specific differences (Battilana et al., 2015; 
Xu et al., 2019). Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity and the 
Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation in panel data of the preliminary analyses reveal traces of 
these problems. Year fixed effects are introduced to allay concern about serial correlation in 
longitudinal series. All models are adjusted with heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered 
by units correcting for within-unit serial correlation (Georgallis et al., 2018; Wooldridge, 2012). 
Unobservable social-economic, demographic, and labor market factors that vary by state are 
captured with binary predictors for U.S. states.  
5. Results 
Our findings are presented in Table 4. First, higher levels of commercialization is associated 
with lower levels of overall compensation spending, programmatic salary spending, and 
fundraising salary spending. More commercialized NPOs in our sample are also associated with 
more part-time employees. Second, turning to our main findings, overall salary spending (H1), 
fundraising salary spending (H2b), programmatic salary spending (H2c), and part-time 
employment (H3) all have a statistically significant nonlinear association with the level of 
commercialization in NPOs. We did not find a statistically significant nonlinear association 
between administrative salary spending and commercialization (H2).  
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[Table 4 about here] 
To understand the nonlinear effects better, we plot the predictive margins in Figure 2. First, 
Figure 2A shows the predicted margins from Model 1. It shows our strongest finding and 
suggests that the negative association between commercialization on NPOs’ overall salary 
spending, persists beyond the 50% point of commercialization. In fact, we observed an inflection 
point only after NPOs generate about 75% or more commercialization. Second, Figure 2B was 
created using predicted margins from Model 3. While we observe an inflection point at about 
20% commercialization, we conclude that the association between commercialization and NPOs’ 
spending on fundraising salary is substantively negative. Third, Figure 2C, was created using 
predicted margins from Model 4. It shows that when it comes to apportioning salary expenses to 
programmatic roles, higher commercialization exerts downward pressure on salary spending on 
programmatic roles until NPOs surpass the 50% commercialization threshold. Beyond this stage, 
NPOs with more commercialization spend increasingly more on programmatic roles, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 2c. Finally, Figure 2D plots predicted margins from Model 5. Again, the 
expected 50% threshold of commercialization is seen to be irrelevant. It shows an inverted U-
shaped association, as expected, between commercialization and the proportion of part-time 
employees in sampled NPOs, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. The relationship is first positive but 
drops off for NPOs that are at about 75% or more commercialization. Unless NPOs are at a very 
high stage of commercialization, they do not seem to create full-time positions. Collectively, 
these findings reveal NPOs at three meaningful stages of commercialization—those at less than 
45% commercialization, those between 45% to 75% commercialization, and those at greater than 
75% commercialization. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
We take several additional steps to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, Ramsey 
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RESET test reveal that we improve upon our linear models’ specification (without squared term), 
by adding the second power of our main predictor and by logging right hand side variables. For 
ease of interpretation, we do not log our predictors. Second, based on the Vuong Likelihood 
Ratio Test (Vuong, 1989; Wooldridge, 2012) we reject the possibility of equivalence between 
control models (without main predictors) and reported models in Table 4. Third, we conducted 
the Hausman specification test on the main effect models to ensure appropriateness of the 
random unit effects (𝜒(29)
2 = 36.30, 𝑝 = 0.17). Fourth, with autoregressive (AR) random effects 
GLS models, adjusting for first-order autoregressive disturbances (Baltagi and Wu, 1999; 
StataCorp, 2017), our overall effect sizes diminish slightly, but our key findings remain 
unchanged. Fifth, we estimate quantile regressions to assess the effect of covariates at various 
quantiles of our outcomes (Dimelis and Louri, 2002). Multiple slopes (at 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
quantiles) were estimated, spanning the minimum to the maximum values of our outcome 
variables (Cade and Noon, 2003). The nonlinear effect size of market-based income on salary 
increases as we move up quantiles of the salary and the program salary variables and decreases 
with each successive quantile of the part-time employee and fundraising salary variables. Both 
support our overall conclusions. Sixth, breaking down commercialization into various quantiles 
(converted to dummy variables) does not offer statistically significant results. It also supports our 
strategy to test NPO entrepreneurship as a proportion in line with previous empirical studies 
(Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Leroux, 2006). Finally, we do not uncover statistically 
significant nonlinear effects of commercialization on NPO spending on average fringe benefits.   
6. Discussion 
Market-based resource dependence in NPOs has been a contentious topic with arguments 
both in favor and against entrepreneurial behavior within NPOs. Our study advances this debate 
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by illuminating how increased dependence on commercialization shifts compensation strategy 
within entrepreneurial NPOs. In our analysis, entrepreneurial NPOs shift risk from 
entrepreneurial exploration to their employees as they transition from contributed to market-
based resource dependency by relying more heavily on part-time labor. Once commercialization 
balances and ultimately eclipses contributed revenue, we see entrepreneurial NPOs shifting the 
composition of their workforce and investing in programmatic salaries and establishing more 
full-time positions to ensure their long-term success. The NPOs with high commercialization 
also reflect bold compensation choices, which suggests that market-based revenue provides 
NPOs the license to be bold and to move beyond externally driven compensation limitations. 
Together, our findings offer a new perspective on strategic compensation practices in 
entrepreneurial NPOs. 
Our analyses reveal nuanced empirical insights and uncover three contributions to the 
broader literature by providing a detailed picture of how shifting resource dependencies are 
managed during commercial transition within entrepreneurial NPOs. First, we find two distinct 
thresholds in NPO commercialization at which NPOs begin to alter their compensation strategies 
in response to shifting resource dependency. Past research has emphasized the importance of a 
50% threshold in NPO commercialization, to distinguish between non-commercial and 
commercial social ventures (DTI, 2002; Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014; Haugh, 2005; Kim, 
2017; King and Lewis, 2017). We show that some of the most interesting NPO entrepreneurial 
choices occur around this halfway point, as NPOs arrive at this transitionary stage and wrestle 
with dual resource dependencies. In our sample and within the context of various compensation 
strategies, this occurs between 45% to 75% levels of commercialization. We show that once ex-
post market-based resource dependencies come to eclipse ex-ante contributed resource 
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dependencies—and the expectations they contain—entrepreneurial NPOs reward talent in highly 
commercialized NPOs.  
Our findings align with our hypotheses, but the threshold surrounding dual resource 
dependence occurs at a higher level of commercialization than would be explained solely by 
reliance on revenue. The powerful legacy of nonprofit sectoral expectations appears to last long 
after their dominance as revenue producers. We interpret this to indicate that contributed 
resource dependencies extend well beyond direct financial contributions, to cover the panoply of 
benefits received by NPOs. Unless NPOs are at a very high stage of commercialization (75% or 
greater in our sample), they continue to adopt donative labor compensation practices, indicating 
that NPOs are cautious about boldly defying nonprofit sectoral norms. Only once market-based 
revenue significantly eclipses contributed revenue are NPOs able to engage in compensation 
strategies that allow employees to reap the rewards.  
This dual threshold offers insight into other research on resource dependency in 
entrepreneurial NPOs. The fact that dual resource dependence is most pronounced between 45-
75% commercialization in our sample may also explain the finding by Gras and Mendoza-
Abarca (2014) that commercialization greater than 50% jeopardizes NPO survival, because of 
added complexity and power imbalance NPOs face at this stage. From a practical standpoint, 
NPOs considering increasing their level of commercialization need to understand that they will 
be managing both dependencies until market-based revenues reach a very high level. Surviving 
the transitory stage of dual resource dependence paves the path to NPO autonomy and bold 
compensation strategies.  
Second, our results show that the tenets of compensation strategy are distinct in 
entrepreneurial NPOs and offers some preliminary empirical evidence exploring the 
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underdeveloped research area of compensation strategies in entrepreneurial contexts (Manne, 
2011). While there exists substantial research on compensation strategies in established for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations, compensation in entrepreneurial NPOs is a distinct area of study and 
provides a theoretically interesting context for examining the dynamics of shifting resource 
dependence. Future research may build on these findings by examining alternate antecedents and 
consequences of either compensation strategies or commercialization in social contexts. 
Furthermore, our analysis illustrates that workforce composition shifts significantly as 
contributed resource dependence decreases, allowing commercialized NPOs to focus more on 
their impact and role within their communities as opposed to seeking contributions.  
Third, while balancing contributed and market-based resource dependence in NPOs may be 
good for their survival (Gras and Mendoza-Abarca, 2014), our study indicates it is not good for 
the employees of NPOs at the stage of dual resource dependency (45% to 75% 
commercialization in our sample). Entrepreneurial NPOs that find themselves at this stage may 
exploit employees by having the greatest reliance on part-time labor and the lowest 
compensation per employee. Therefore, from a compensation perspective, employees of NPOs 
are worse off under dual resource dependence than they are in those purely dependent on either 
contributed or market-based resources.  
From a practical point of view, hiring part-time workers allows NPOs access to a wider range 
of skills, which would be necessary for organizations with dual resource dependence, at a lower 
cost than hiring full-time employees. However, part-time workers are often less committed, often 
associated with operational disruption, breakdown in communication, slow organizational 
learning, less positive work attitudes, and higher turnover intentions (De Stefano et al., 
forthcoming). In addition, most part-time workers do not usually have job security or earn fringe 
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benefits, and this practice likely benefits the NPO more than the employees. The expectation that 
employees should sacrifice compensation that permeates the nonprofit sector becomes even 
greater in entrepreneurial NPOs with dual resource dependence. Perhaps a strategic dependence 
on part-time labor is an unintended consequence of funders and overseers exerting pressure on 
entrepreneurial NPOs to be good stewards of resources. Such pressures, in other contexts, have 
been associated with NPO managers engaging in various dysfunctional behavior (Krawczyk et 
al., 2017; Parsons et al., 2017). Our findings illustrate that managers of entrepreneurial NPOs in 
the transitional stage need to consider how they can effectively manage the downsides of part-
time labor force.  
We find it notable that while compensation improves at the highest levels of 
commercialization, it never exceeds the level of compensation when an NPO is wholly 
dependent on contributed revenue. This indicates that while diversifying revenue sources may be 
of benefit to the organization, commercialization does not correspond to higher wages for 
employees once contributed resource dependence has diminished. Studies like Eikenberry and 
Kluver (2004) warn against commercialization of NPOs as being detrimental to mission value of 
these organizations. In the case of arts and culture organizations, employees may also be the 
intended beneficiaries and it is unclear whether the reduction in average salary impacts their 
organization’s ability to achieve their missions. The reliance on the exploitation of donated labor 
throughout various stages of commercialization raises questions about the responsibilities of 
NPOs to their stakeholders. Future research should seek to connect shifts in resource dependence 
with social impact and other organizational outcomes relevant for NPOs. 
Limitations of our study offer more opportunities for future research. First, despite the virtues 
of the highly vetted DataArts sample (e.g. Charles and Kim, 2016; Kim, 2017; Kim and Charles, 
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2016; Kim et al., 2017), it allows us to only capture mostly larger mature arts and cultural NPOs 
in the U.S. Other sectors may have differing compensation practices because they have different 
skill requirements, particularly in programmatic roles, which may lead to different relationships 
to the labor market and strategic response. In entrepreneurial contexts, smaller and nascent 
organizations also tend to act differently. Also, other countries have different regulation relating 
to NPOs, particularly around their ability to earn revenue from product sales. Therefore, we 
especially welcome future research to test the generalizability of our findings across sectors and 
national contexts.  
Second, despite the rigor of our empirical analysis, we cannot fully discount the possibility of 
autocorrelated and heteroskedastic residuals as is the case for many similar studies. To allay 
concerns of model misspecification, omitted variable bias, heteroskedasticity, and other standard 
concerns, great care was taken to estimate several different model specifications and additional 
tests, as discussed in our findings section. Across nearly all models and configurations tested, we 
consistently observe the same basic pattern of results. Nonetheless, we acknowledge this 
limitation and encourage caution in interpreting our findings. We welcome future research to test 
the generalizability of our findings with different data and model specifications.  
Third, our data is limited to organizational level total expenditures and does not contain 
granular breakdowns of compensation by position or demographics. The comparison of 
executive pay to average worker is an important issue (Kim et al., 2015) and has important 
implications for pro-social contexts (Mohan et al., 2018). Future research examining differences 
in compensation across job types in entrepreneurial NPOs would be especially valuable. There 
may be variation between front line employee and the top echelons of these organizations. The 
importance of senior managers and leaders (CEO, Board, etc.) is well established in the 
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entrepreneurship literature (Daily, 1992). Top managers establish organizational vision and 
support employees through organizational changes (Breit et al., 2018; Murphy and Coombes, 
2009; Steckler and Bartunek, 2012) as they establish a culture of entrepreneurial opportunity 
seeking, which would justify higher wages to attract and retain talent. Dependence on 
inexperienced employees can hinder scaling (Battilana and Dorado, 2010), and vertical pay 
disparity can depress social value creation (Hart et al., 2015). Practically speaking, if 
entrepreneurial NPOs myopically minimize compensation expenditure in pursuit of social 
objectives, they risk the long-term viability of their commercial goals and employee welfare.  
7. Conclusion 
Our findings raise significant questions within both the nonprofit management and social 
entrepreneurship literature streams relating to the central purpose of NPOs and social purpose 
organizations and their responsibilities to all their stakeholders—employees included. Much of 
the research and discussion on entrepreneurial NPOs (and social entrepreneurship) has focused 
on their role within communities, relationship with funders, and efficacy. Less attention has been 
paid to the impact commercialization has on employees, which represent the third largest sector 
of workers within the US labor force (Salamon, 2018). Our research offers insights into this 
important topic and the way employee commitment to mission has been leveraged to shift risk 
away from entrepreneurial exploration within NPOs. We hope that our findings spark 
conversation amongst researchers, NPO managers, and policy makers about the responsibilities 
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H2: There will be a nonlinear relationship between commercialization and compensation by job roles in 
NPOs, such that: 
Administrative roles are viewed 
negatively because they are 
perceived to deviate spending from 
mission 
Pressure to keep compensation 
spending low will intensify to 
preserve legitimacy, depressing 
administrative spending 
Administrative roles are necessary 
to integrate blended goals 
H2a: For administrative roles, there will be a convex relationship between commercialization and salary 
spending 
Requires fundraising expertise to 
attract resources from contributed 
sources 
Requires both fundraising and 
business expertise 
Requires business expertise in 
place of fundraising expertise 
H2b: For fundraising roles, there will be a concave relationship between commercialization and salary 
spending 
Programmatic roles help execute 
mission in NPOs and are 
prioritized 
Downward pressure on 
compensation spending will be 
most acute in programmatic roles 
because of employee willingness to 
donate labor 
Programmatic roles will be 
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and prevent mission drift 





















Part-time labor allows for efficient 
use of resources but comes with 
challenges. 
Contingent employees allow NPOs 
to optimize workforce size and 
reduce risk of pursuing new 
market-based strategies 
Once market based resource 
dependence eclipses contributed 
resource dependence, 
entrepreneurial NPOs will respond 
by creating full time positions to 
retain the talent necessary to attract 
market-based revenue 





Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  mean s.d. min max 
Sal/Emp 26.98961 25.15031 0.000333 2590 
Part/Emp 0.520055 0.335349 0 1 
Prog/Sal 0.495208 0.297039 0 1 
Fund/Sal 0.095112 0.094627 0 1 
Admin/Sal 0.256675 0.231043 0 1 
%Commercial 0.415682 0.257902 0 1 
Age (years) 43.37737 28.21177 2 161 
Assets(log)                    13.7202 2.147138 1.386294 22.11017 
%Government                    0.126 0.183601 0 1 
%Donations                     0.107374 0.125382 0 0.996039 
ROA                            2.221114 603.1757 -28004.7 92415 
Margin                         -0.037 0.769441 -72.4661 5.469707 
Competition                    36.03535 49.45727 1 210 
Volunteers                     136.6119 474.7548 0 21345 
Board Size                     17.40198 9.707128 0 58 
Dance(1=Yes)                   0.063233 0.243385 0 1 
Design Arts(1=Yes)             0.011019 0.104393 0 1 
Folklife/Traditional Arts(1=Yes) 0.017054 0.129476 0 1 
Humanities/Storytelling(1=Yes) 0.016587 0.12772 0 1 
Interdisciplinary(1=Yes)       0.043687 0.204401 0 1 
Literature(1=Yes)              0.018456 0.134595 0 1 
Media Arts(1=Yes)              0.044816 0.206903 0 1 
Multidisciplinary(1=Yes)       0.283768 0.450834 0 1 
Music(1=Yes)                   0.148269 0.355374 0 1 
Non-Arts/Non-Humanities(1=Yes) 0.04065 0.197481 0 1 
Opera/Musical Theatre(1=Yes)   0.037028 0.188835 0 1 
Photography(1=Yes)             0.003972 0.062896 0 1 
Theatre(1=Yes)                 0.160534 0.367108 0 1 





Table 3: Pairwise Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Sal/Emp 1.0000                            
2 Part/Emp -0.6818* 1.0000              
3 Prog/Sal 0.2012* -0.1646* 1.0000             
4 Fund/Sal 0.1959* -0.1354* 0.0173* 1.0000            
5 Admin/Sal -0.0467* -0.0469* -0.5265* -0.2186* 1.0000           
6 %Commercial -0.1632* 0.1778* -0.0651* -0.1802* 0.0820* 1.0000          
7 Age  0.0413* 0.0159* 0.0353* 0.0127 0.0239* 0.1784* 1.0000         
8 Assets(log)                    0.2128* -0.0464* 0.2115* 0.1527* -0.1556* 0.1124* 0.3917* 1.0000        
9 %Government                    0.0465* -0.1098* 0.1303* -0.1003* -0.0115 -0.3985* -0.0451* -0.0944* 1.0000       
10 %Donations                     0.0244* 0.0063 -0.0879* 0.1066* 0.0307* -0.2243* 0.0499* 0.0588* -0.2164* 1.0000      
11 ROA                            -0.0148* 0.0057 0.0050 0.0076 -0.0142* 0.0004  0.0100 0.0425* 0.0050 -0.0078 1.0000     
12 Margin                         -0.0159* 0.0152* -0.0078 0.0451* -0.0144* 0.0335* 0.0004 0.0344* -0.0943* 0.0352* 0.0025 1.0000    
13 Competition                    0.0294* 0.0202* -0.0194* 0.0127 -0.1197* -0.0620* -0.1201* -0.0614* -0.0471* -0.0549* 0.0041 -0.0020 1.0000   
14 Volunteers                     -0.0032 0.0171* 0.0681* 0.0158* -0.0373* 0.0693* 0.1050* 0.2021* -0.0430* 0.0139* 0.0012 0.0150* -0.0634* 1.0000  
15 Board Size                     0.1367* -0.0047 0.0549* 0.1599* -0.0763* 0.0587* 0.3523* 0.5701* -0.1270* 0.0707* -0.0029 0.0372* -0.0603* 0.1972* 
16 Dance(1=Yes)                   -0.0628* 0.0484* -0.1543* -0.0794* -0.0319* 0.0603* -0.0855* -0.1177* -0.0380* -0.0523* 0.0016 -0.0020 0.0237* -0.0569* 
17 Design Arts(1=Yes)             0.0384* -0.0363* 0.0131 0.0222* 0.0133 -0.0017  0.0103 0.0096 0.0077 -0.0262* 0.0008 0.0055 -0.0585* 0.0083 
18 
Folklife/Traditional 
Arts(1=Yes) -0.0259* -0.0027 0.0348* -0.0054 -0.0075 0.0032  0.0037 -0.0214* 0.0444* -0.0120 0.0010 -0.0130 -0.0793* 0.0179* 
19 
Humanities/ 
Storytelling(1=Yes) 0.0228* -0.0302* 0.0482* 0.0114 0.0149* -0.0069  0.0536* 0.0752* 0.0248* 0.0300* 0.0009 -0.0132 -0.0825* -0.0041 
20 Interdisciplinary(1=Yes)       0.0383* -0.0391* 0.0716* 0.0045 -0.0090 -0.0551* 0.0172* 0.0426* 0.0526* -0.0221* 0.0016 -0.0137 -0.0972* -0.0065 
21 Literature(1=Yes)              0.0793* -0.0917* 0.0540* 0.0129 -0.0101 -0.0437* -0.0298* -0.0283* 0.0139* 0.0032 0.0010 0.0036 -0.0685* -0.0029 
22 Media Arts(1=Yes)              0.0897* -0.0906* 0.0964* 0.0198* -0.0347* -0.0326* -0.0635* 0.0073 0.0022 0.0154* 0.0015 0.0040 -0.0910* 0.0090 
23 Multidisciplinary(1=Yes)       0.0790* -0.0876* 0.2214* 0.0188* -0.0270* -0.0910* -0.0113 0.0695* 0.2055* -0.1003* -0.0112 -0.0201* 0.1369* 0.0198* 
24 Music(1=Yes)                   -0.0120 0.0887* -0.2149* 0.0299* 0.0539* 0.0227* 0.0531* -0.1105* -0.1382* 0.1379* 0.0030 0.0138* 0.0330* -0.0315* 
25 
Non-Arts/Non-
Humanities(1=Yes) 0.0352* -0.0370* 0.1016* -0.0147* -0.0241* -0.0253* 0.0709* 0.1095* 0.0955* -0.0227* 0.0014 -0.0034 -0.1199* 0.0537* 
26 
Opera/Musical  
Theatre(1=Yes)   -0.0223* 0.0465* -0.1055* 0.0209* 0.0511* -0.0012  0.0046 -0.0044 -0.0562* 0.0853* 0.0013 -0.0030 -0.1183* -0.0165* 
27 Photography(1=Yes)             0.0144* -0.0199* 0.0202* 0.0088 -0.0085 -0.0085  -0.0096 -0.0126 -0.0044 -0.0083 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0436* -0.0133 
28 Theatre(1=Yes)                 -0.2220* 0.1859* -0.1889* -0.0964* -0.0007 0.1220* -0.1170* -0.0877* -0.1103* -0.0069 0.0029 0.0114 0.2297* 0.0226* 
29 Visual Arts(1=Yes)        0.0773* -0.0869* 0.0964* 0.0777* 0.0182* -0.0062  0.1306* 0.1223* -0.0628* 0.0104 0.0026 0.0192* -0.1280* 0.0013 
Notes:  










Table 3: Pairwise Correlations (cont) 
    15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
1 Sal/Emp                               
2 Part/Emp                 
3 Prog/Sal                 
4 Fund/Sal                 
5 Admin/Sal                 
6 %Commercial                 
7 Age                  
8 Assets(log)                                    
9 %Government                                    
10 %Donations                                     
11 ROA                                            
12 Margin                                         
13 Competition                                    
14 Volunteers                                     
15 Board Size                     1.0000                 
16 Dance(1=Yes)                   -0.1001* 1.0000                
17 Design Arts(1=Yes)             0.0310* -0.0275* 1.0000               
18 
Folklife/Traditional 
Arts(1=Yes) -0.0535* -0.0352* -0.0138* 1.0000              
19 
Humanities/ 
Storytelling(1=Yes) 0.0308* -0.0334* -0.0131 -0.0168* 1.0000             
20 Interdisciplinary(1=Yes)       0.0071 -0.0553* -0.0217* -0.0279* -0.0264* 1.0000            
21 Literature(1=Yes)              -0.0419* -0.0364* -0.0143* -0.0183* -0.0174* -0.0288* 1.0000           
22 Media Arts(1=Yes)              -0.0606* -0.0569* -0.0224* -0.0287* -0.0272* -0.0450* -0.0296* 1.0000          
23 Multidisciplinary(1=Yes)       -0.0003 -0.1654* -0.0650* -0.0833* -0.0790* -0.1309* -0.0861* -0.1346* 1.0000         
24 Music(1=Yes)                   0.0394* -0.1120* -0.0440* -0.0564* -0.0535* -0.0887* -0.0583* -0.0912* -0.2649* 1.0000        
25 
Non-Arts/Non-
Humanities(1=Yes) 0.0469* -0.0502* -0.0197* -0.0253* -0.0240* -0.0398* -0.0261* -0.0409* -0.1188* -0.0805* 1.0000       
26 
Opera/Musical 
Theatre(1=Yes)   0.0970* -0.0514* -0.0202* -0.0259* -0.0245* -0.0407* -0.0267* -0.0418* -0.1216* -0.0823* -0.0369* 1.0000      
27 Photography(1=Yes)             -0.0176* -0.0165* -0.0065 -0.0083 -0.0079 -0.0131  -0.0086 -0.0134 -0.0390* -0.0264* -0.0118 -0.0121 1.0000     
28 Theatre(1=Yes)                 -0.0259* -0.1182* -0.0464* -0.0595* -0.0564* -0.0936* -0.0615* -0.0962* -0.2796* -0.1893* -0.0849* -0.0869* -0.0279* 1.0000    
29 Visual Arts(1=Yes)        0.0400* -0.0902* -0.0355* -0.0455* -0.0431* -0.0714* -0.0470* -0.0734* -0.2135* -0.1446* -0.0648* -0.0663* -0.0213* -0.1525* 1.0000  
Notes: 
*p<0.05                 
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Table 4: Commercial Revenue and NPO Compensation Strategy 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Sal/Emp Admin/Sal Fund/Sal Prog/Sal Part/Emp 
(%Commercial)2 6.2405 *** 0.0019  -0.0143 * 0.0476 * -0.0806 *** 
                               (1.5584) (0.0196)  (0.0072) (0.0208) (0.0238) 
%Commercial                    -9.4564 *** 0.0199  -0.0164 * -0.0424 * 0.1228 *** 
                               (1.5275) (0.0181)  (0.0074) (0.0197) (0.0231) 
Age                            -0.0082 * 0.0002 *** -0.0000 * -0.0002 ** -0.0000 
                               (0.0035) (0.0001)  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Assets(log)                    0.5084 *** -0.0054 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0055 *** -0.0016 
                               (0.0696) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
%Government                    -2.1654 *** 0.0138 -0.0308 *** 0.0201 * 0.0081 
                               (0.6465) (0.0084) (0.0033) (0.0087) (0.0100) 
%Donations                     -2.4657 ** 0.0216 0.0021 -0.0323 ** 0.0242 
                               (0.8534) (0.0121) (0.0052) (0.0125) (0.0133) 
ROA                            -0.0006 *** 0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 
                               (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Margin                         -0.3985 *** 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0013 0.0014 
                               (0.0785) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Competition                    0.0082 ** -0.0002 *** 0.0000 * 0.0001 *** -0.0001 
                               (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Volunteers                     -0.0005 * 0.0000 -0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 
                               (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Board Size                     0.0311 * -0.0003 0.0002 ** -0.0001 -0.0000 
                               (0.0156) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Lagged DV 0.7052 *** 0.6261 *** 0.6793 *** 0.7077 *** 0.7450 *** 
                               (0.0129) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0079) (0.0069) 
Dance                   -1.5152 * -0.0078 -0.0103 -0.0681 *** 0.0273 
                               (0.7679) (0.0179) (0.0069) (0.0167) (0.0145) 
Design Arts             3.2667 ** -0.0041 0.0027 0.0126 -0.0403 
                               (1.1586) (0.0219) (0.0083) (0.0199) (0.0207) 
Folklife/Trad. Arts -0.8693 -0.0010 -0.0069 0.0092 0.0098 
                               (0.8638) (0.0188) (0.0078) (0.0177) (0.0169) 
Humanities/Storytelling -0.3224  0.0136 -0.0081 0.0173 0.0096 
                               (0.8442)  (0.0203) (0.0077) (0.0180) (0.0162) 
Interdisciplinary  -0.0563  0.0055 -0.0055 0.0053 0.0128 
                               (0.8527)  (0.0182) (0.0070) (0.0168) (0.0149) 
Literature  2.5615 ** 0.0006 -0.0043 0.0010 -0.0238 
                               (0.9627)  (0.0201) (0.0072) (0.0186) (0.0168) 
Media Arts  1.9313 * -0.0102 -0.0051 0.0231 -0.0137 
                               (0.8408)  (0.0181) (0.0070) (0.0167) (0.0144) 
Multidisciplinary  -0.1153  0.0086 -0.0054 0.0055 0.0138 
                               (0.7359)  (0.0173) (0.0067) (0.0158) (0.0134) 
Music  -0.4725  0.0155 -0.0031 -0.0591 *** 0.0406 ** 
                               (0.7667)  (0.0176) (0.0068) (0.0161) (0.0138) 
Non-Arts/Humanities 0.2120  -0.0031 -0.0075 0.0155 0.0086 
                               (0.8518)  (0.0182) (0.0071) (0.0167) (0.0147) 
Opera/Musical Theatre  -2.3185 * 0.0295 -0.0068 -0.0634 *** 0.0539 *** 
                               (0.9579)  (0.0193) (0.0072) (0.0177) (0.0160) 
Photography  1.7994  0.0057 -0.0020 0.0051 -0.0234 
                               (1.4668)  (0.0240) (0.0092) (0.0240) (0.0243) 
Theatre  -3.5485 *** 0.0110 -0.0099 -0.0561 *** 0.0578 *** 
                               (0.7672)  (0.0176) (0.0067) (0.0161) (0.0138) 
Visual Arts  0.4887  0.0096 -0.0008 0.0041 0.0021 
                               (0.7455)  (0.0176) (0.0068) (0.0160) (0.0137) 
R-square 0.6779  0.6701  0.6678 0.6947 0.7086 
Vuong Likelihood Ratio Test  -20.9514 *** -0.0007 ** -0.0002 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0051 *** 
N                              19995  20000  20002  20000  19995 
 
Cluster(id) s.e.; Two-tailed tests of significance; Unit r.e.; US state and year f.e 
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N mean s.d. N mean s.d. N mean s.d. t d.f. p-value*
Sal/Emp ($1000) 16725 20.2866 18.8952 20.0003 20.5730 25683 26.9896 25.1503 26.6820 27.2972 42408 24.3461 23.1215 24.1260 24.5661 -29.4735 42406 0.0000
Part/Emp 16725 0.5911 0.3867 0.5853 0.5970 25683 0.5201 0.3353 0.5160 0.5242 42408 0.5481 0.3582 0.5447 0.5515 20.0671 42406 0.0000
Prog/Sal 16715 0.3696 0.3562 0.3642 0.3750 25691 0.4951 0.2971 0.4915 0.4987 42406 0.4456 0.3275 0.4425 0.4488 -39.2697 42404 0.0000
Fund/Sal 16716 0.0550 0.0947 0.0536 0.0565 25691 0.0951 0.0946 0.0939 0.0963 42407 0.0793 0.0967 0.0784 0.0802 -42.5766 42405 0.0000
Admin/Sal 16715 0.4198 0.3633 0.4143 0.4253 25691 0.2567 0.2310 0.2539 0.2595 42406 0.3210 0.3012 0.3181 0.3238 56.4936 42404 0.0000
%Commercial 37660 0.3991 0.2872 0.3962 0.4020 25691 0.4157 0.2579 0.4125 0.4188 63351 0.4058 0.2758 0.4037 0.4080 -7.4421 63349 0.0000
Age (years) 37153 30.8782 26.0344 30.6134 31.1429 25691 43.3748 28.2092 43.0299 43.7198 62844 35.9869 27.6360 35.7708 36.2029 -57.1580 62842 0.0000
Assets(log)                   28146 1.3157 4.1071 1.2677 1.3637 25691 13.7195 2.1474 13.6932 13.7457 53837 7.0287 7.0287 7.1754 7.2941 -430.0000 53835 0.0000
%Government                   37650 0.1089 0.1681 0.1072 0.1106 25691 0.1260 0.1836 0.1237 0.1282 63341 0.1158 0.1747 0.1145 0.1172 -12.1112 63339 0.0000
%Donations                    37645 0.1140 0.1526 0.1124 0.1155 25691 0.1074 0.1254 0.1058 0.1089 63336 0.1113 0.1422 0.1102 0.1124 5.7532 63334 0.0000
ROA                           2806 -0.1832 13.0247 -0.6653 0.2990 25691 2.2205 603.0818 -5.1544 9.5954 28497 1.9838 572.6348 -4.6650 8.6327 -0.2111 28495 0.8328
Margin                        37594 -0.5852 78.3783 -1.3775 0.2071 25691 -0.0370 0.7693 -0.0464 -0.0276 63285 -0.3627 60.4117 -0.8333 0.1080 -1.1211 63283 0.2622
Competition                   37758 35.7235 46.3610 35.2558 36.1911 25691 36.0264 49.4524 35.4216 36.6311 63449 35.8461 47.6368 35.4754 36.2168 -0.7862 63447 0.4317
Volunteers                    37758 60.9408 294.0834 57.9744 63.9072 25691 136.5795 474.6848 130.7747 142.3842 63449 91.5675 379.5769 88.6139 94.5210 -24.7578 63447 0.0000
Board Size                    37141 0.0912 0.2880 9.5054 9.6491 25691 17.4005 9.7066 17.2818 17.5192 62832 12.77604 9.1022 12.7049 12.8472 12.7806 63445 0.0000
Dance(1=Yes)                  37756 0.0912 0.2880 0.0883 0.0941 25691 0.0633 0.2434 0.0603 0.0662 63447 0.0799 0.2712 0.0778 0.0820 12.7806 63445 0.0000
Design Arts(1=Yes)            37756 0.0047 0.0685 0.0040 0.0054 25691 0.0110 0.1044 0.0097 0.0123 63447 0.0073 0.0849 0.0066 0.0079 -9.1793 63445 0.0000
Folklife/Traditional Arts(1=Yes) 37756 0.0298 0.1700 0.0281 0.0315 25691 0.0170 0.1295 0.0155 0.0186 63447 0.0246 0.1550 0.0234 0.0258 10.1766 63445 0.0000
Humanities/Storytelling(1=Yes) 37756 0.0079 0.0883 0.0070 0.0088 25691 0.0166 0.1277 0.0150 0.0181 63447 0.0114 0.1061 0.0106 0.0122 -10.1610 63445 0.0000
Interdisciplinary(1=Yes)      37756 0.0423 0.2013 0.0403 0.0443 25691 0.0437 0.2044 0.0412 0.0462 63447 0.0429 0.2025 0.0413 0.0444 -0.8394 63445 0.4012
Literature(1=Yes)             37756 0.0285 0.1663 0.0268 0.0302 25691 0.0185 0.1347 0.0168 0.0201 63447 0.0244 0.1544 0.0232 0.0256 7.9997 63445 0.0000
Media Arts(1=Yes)             37756 0.0331 0.1790 0.0313 0.0349 25691 0.0448 0.2070 0.0423 0.0474 63447 0.0379 0.1909 0.0364 0.0394 -7.5861 63445 0.0000
Multidisciplinary(1=Yes)      37756 0.2387 0.4263 0.2344 0.2430 25691 0.2837 0.4508 0.2782 0.2892 63447 0.2569 0.4369 0.2535 0.2603 -12.7551 63445 0.0000
Music(1=Yes)                  37756 0.2399 0.4270 0.2356 0.2442 25691 0.1483 0.3554 0.1440 0.1527 63447 0.2028 0.4021 0.1997 0.2060 28.3340 63445 0.0000
Non-Arts/Non-Humanities(1=Yes) 37756 0.0197 0.1391 0.0183 0.0211 25691 0.0406 0.1975 0.0382 0.0431 63447 0.0282 0.1655 0.0269 0.0295 -15.6446 63445 0.0000
Opera/Musical Theatre(1=Yes)  37756 0.0302 0.1712 0.0285 0.0319 25691 0.0370 0.1888 0.0347 0.0393 63447 0.0330 0.1786 0.0316 0.0344 -4.7069 63445 0.0000
Photography(1=Yes)            37756 0.0032 0.0561 0.0026 0.0037 25691 0.0040 0.0629 0.0032 0.0047 63447 0.0035 0.0589 0.0030 0.0039 -1.7177 63445 0.0859
Theatre(1=Yes)                37756 0.1510 0.3580 0.1474 0.1546 25691 0.1606 0.3671 0.1561 0.1651 63447 0.1549 0.3618 0.1521 0.1577 -3.2697 63445 0.0000
Visual Arts(1=Yes)       37756 0.0766 0.2660 0.0739 0.0793 25691 0.1041 0.3054 0.1003 0.1078 63447 0.0877 0.2829 0.0855 0.0899 -12.0268 63445 0.0000
*two tailed test
Not in sample In sample Combined
95% Conf. Interval95% Conf. Interval 95% Conf. Interval
